Home DORA ComplianceConquer DORA Compliance: Real Challenges and Strategies from the Eviden Frontlines

Conquer DORA Compliance: Real Challenges and Strategies from the Eviden Frontlines

by internationalbanker

By Dr. Sławomir Pijanowski, Global Governance Risk Compliance Practice Leader, and Pawan Mishra, Global Financial Services and Insurance Market Leader, Eviden

 

 

 

The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), a groundbreaking European Union (EU) regulation, aims to strengthen defences against escalating digital threats and foster resilience in the financial sector. Covering more than 22,000 financial entities and their information and communications technology (ICT) service providers, DORA mandates strict standards for managing, responding to and recovering from ICT-related incidents. With the January 2025 compliance deadline looming, the stakes are high. Non-compliance could lead to severe penalties, operational restrictions and significant reputational damages.

In this article, we will explore two of DORA’s most challenging requirements1 for Eviden’s customers and share effective strategies for addressing them successfully.

The five pillars of DORA compliance, © Eviden

Key DORA challenge #1: threat-led penetration testing (TLPT)

(Part of Chapter IV, “Digital Operational Resilience Testing”, also called Pillar 3. Articles 24-27 in the final text for DORA2.)

DORA mandates threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) every three years, starting after January 17, 2025, which could pose challenges because TLPT preparation takes months. The TLPT approach is based on the TIBER-EU (Threat Intelligence-based Ethical Red Teaming) framework3, developed by the European Central Bank (ECB) and national central banks, and is inspired by other global security standards, such as the G7 (Group of Seven) framework4 and the United Kingdom’s CBEST (Critical National Infrastructure Banking Supervision and Evaluation Testing).

So, what is TLPT?

Effective testing, in general, demands creativity and imagination to anticipate and assess scenarios beyond the obvious to ensure robust results.

Penetration testing, or pen testing, is a security assessment that simulates cyberattacks on computer systems to identify vulnerabilities attackers could exploit. It involves a cybersecurity expert attempting to find and exploit weak spots in a system’s defences. Penetration testing commonly focuses on uncovering security gaps in web applications (for example, logging into a bank’s website) and mobile applications (e.g., e-banking apps) or, on a more detailed level, IT/OT (information technology/operational technology) and network infrastructure. The testing approach is guided by factors such as:

  • Attack scenarios: Often based on frameworks such as the MITRE ATT&CK5 (MITRE ATT&CK is a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. The ATT&CK knowledge base is used as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies in the private sector, the government and the cybersecurity product and service community.)
  • Scope and standards: Defined by the contract and may follow guidelines such as OWASP Web Security Testing Guide (WSTG)6 or Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG)7 (previously known as OWASP MSTG [Mobile Security Testing Guide]8).
  • Time and expertise: Factors that determine the depth of the assessment.
  • Severity of the vulnerabilities: Evaluated using metrics such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) to indicate low, medium, high or critical vulnerabilities, helping prioritise remediation efforts.

TLPT takes a broader, more holistic approach, evaluating an organisation’s overall resilience by focusing not only on technical aspects but also on the effectiveness of its people and procedures.

DORA defines TLPT as “a framework that mimics the tactics, techniques, and procedures of real-life threat actors to deliver a controlled, intelligence-led test on a financial entity’s critical live systems”. The goal of TLPT is to realistically assess a financial institution’s ability to defend against and respond to cyberattacks, ensuring the resilience and security of critical financial systems.

To better appreciate the threat-led approach, one needs to understand the risk cause-and-effect chain, which is composed of Agent → Threat → Vulnerabilities of System/Network or its Safeguard (control) → Incident →Business Impact. Broken down, this chain reads better as: An agent with a specific motivation (e.g., state-sponsored group, hacktivist, insider) inflicting a threat or specific attack (e.g., implementing malware or phishing) exploiting organisational or technical vulnerabilities/weaknesses causing a cyber incident or disruption (such as the loss of data availability, accuracy or confidentiality) resulting in business impacts (immediate effects, such as service disruptions, and secondary effects, such as reputational damages and penalties).

This framework illustrates how attackers may exploit vulnerabilities, leading to incidents with both short- and long-term consequences, providing a clearer picture of organisational resilience.

Risk cause-and-effect chain, © Eviden

Goals and main steps

TLPT will be mandatory only for specific financial institutions as designated by regulators, focusing on critical functions and services. Each test’s scope will be defined by the institution and approved by the relevant authorities.

To prepare, financial organisations must identify all relevant ICT processes, systems and technologies that support their critical or important functions, including those managed by third-party providers. If third parties are involved, the financial institution must ensure their participation in the testing process.

This is followed by threat research, similar to intelligence gathering, to develop threat-based attack scenarios. These scenarios are provided by expert communities, authorities or computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) under strict supervision. A threat intelligence provider (TIP) plays a key role by simulating hacker reconnaissance on the financial organisation. The provider compiles its findings into a targeted threat intelligence (TTI) report detailing attack scenarios based on the organisation’s specific vulnerabilities.

Source: Final Report on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) specifying elements related to threat-led penetration tests under Article 26(11) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554

Then comes the testing. In TLPT, a red team is the group of experts conducting simulated attacks, while a blue team is responsible for defending against the red team’s attacks.

Once the tests are completed, the financial institution and external testers must submit documentation to the competent authority, confirming if the tests met the required standards. The authority will then review the submission and issue a certification.

Insights from Eviden’s experiences with TIBER-EU and TLPT

Eviden’s team has led multiple TIBER-EU projects, providing a solid foundation for aligning with DORA’s TLPT requirements. Drawing from our extensive experience, we can provide the following tips:

  • Threat intelligence (TI) gaps: TI guides red teaming by shaping attack scenarios, but when sourced from multiple providers or authorities, it may not align well with testing needs, limiting its value.
  • Coordination challenges: Frequent meetings and detailed reporting to national or regional financial authorities create significant operational effort.
  • Precise audit trails: Compliance demands highly detailed logs with timestamps down to the second, adding complexity to documentation.
  • Scenario separation: TLPT usually requires three distinct scenarios, each needing clear technical separation to avoid overlaps.
  • Red team manager requirements: Finding qualified red team managers with the necessary technical skills, credibility and ethical standards is difficult.
  • Aligning TLPT results with frameworks: Aligning TLPT findings with information-security management systems (for example, ISO 27001/2), business-continuity management systems (such as ISO 22301) or cybersecurity frameworks (for example, NIST Cybersecurity Framework [CSF] 1.1/2.0) can be complex when completing documentation or implementing products and platforms to support technical aspects of operational-resilience requirements. Maturity models often focus on what measures are in place rather than how effective those measures are at controlling risk. This can lead to misinterpretations when analysts or auditors assign maturity levels based on TLPT findings.
  • Challenges with risk and vulnerability assessments: Ranking vulnerabilities qualitatively is tricky without fully understanding the cause-and-effect relationship between risks and business impacts. As a result, TLPT findings may be misjudged, affecting impact assessments on operational resilience.
  • Connection between DORA TLPT and other standards: Efforts are underway9 to align DORA TLPT with the TIBER-EU framework as outlined in the RTS (Regulatory Technical Standard: final report on Regulatory Technical Standards specifying elements related to TLPT). But full harmonisation is challenging due to variations in national TIBER frameworks, ultimately leaving each country’s specific version of TIBER decisive.

An official ECB publication10 highlights the challenges:

 “Guiding TLPT is a specific area of expertise and is outside the usual skillset associated with supervision. Such testing needs to be executed effectively and securely, especially given that TLPT will be conducted on live production systems. […] Guiding and performing TLPT on the basis of the DORA regulatory technical standards alone will be challenging given the high standards required by such tests. Contextualisation, detailed and in-depth guidance, lessons learned from experience or best practices for TLPT are not included in the [DORA] legal text. Effectively executing the various elements of the testing process requires a specific set of skills and knowledge, while testing may also pose many challenges to authorities and financial entities that are new to TLPT. TIBER-EU will alleviate these difficulties to a large extent and provides a framework that can be used to fulfil the DORA TLPT requirements.”

TLPT basically comes down to following the detailed TIBER-EU methodology. Effective execution requires substantial time and collaboration. Many of our customers underestimate the effort involved, sometimes requesting a TIBER-EU project with just a month’s notice, which is unrealistic. TLPT projects are complex and typically span several months. They demand careful planning and sustained collaboration between the financial institution and the red team provider. So, it’s crucial to start preparations as soon as a notification is received.

Key DORA challenge #2: ICT third-party risk management (TPRM)

(Also called Pillar 4 and detailed in Chapter V, Articles 28-44, in the final text for DORA11)

Another key challenge in complying with DORA is managing ICT third-party risks in a way that is tailored and proportional to the critical and important functions of financial institutions. Our financial-services clients have struggled to meet Pillar 4 requirements, with their current risk management, procurement and cybersecurity frameworks needing improvements to align with DORA’s standards.

Third-party register: Where it all begins?

One might think we should begin with Article 28, which outlines general principles, including the need for a register of information (ROI) related to all contractual arrangements with ICT third-party providers (TPPs). This would be followed by addressing Article 29 for the preliminary assessment of ICT-concentration risk and then Article 30 for key contractual provisions, along with the related European supervisory authorities’ (ESAs’) guidance: Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) and RTS. (Relevant ITS and RTS for DORA third-party risk management [TPRM] include the final report on draft RTS on ICT Risk Management Framework [JC 2023 86]12, which further details Pillar 1 [ICT Risk Management Framework {RMF}]; the final report on draft RTS for ICT services supporting critical functions [JC 2023 84]13, part of Pillar 4; the final report on draft ITS on Register of Information for ICT third-party contractual registers [JC 2023 85]14, part of Pillar 4; and the consultation paper on subcontracting ICT services [JC 2023 67]15, part of Pillar 4.)

Instead of starting with these articles, we recommend beginning by conducting a thorough as-is diagnosis of the existing ICT risk-management measures, such as documentation (policies and procedures) and risk analyses and scoring tools, which can be considered organic compliance. This involves:

  • Assessing the alignment between strategic goals and ICT third-party objectives while considering trade-offs and risks.
  • Checking how ICT third-party risks are integrated into the overall risk model, including risk-loss exposure calculations and cyber-threat scenarios from ICT service providers (as outlined in DORA Pillar 1 regarding the ICT Risk Management Framework).
  • Ensuring policies include risk-based decision-making throughout the procurement lifecycle, evaluating ICT-supplier resilience beyond traditional financial stability or credit-risk assessments to include the cyber resilience of the provider and its key subcontractors or sub-suppliers.

This approach helps us determine if existing measures and skills align with business objectives and acceptable risks and can identify missing, misaligned or counterproductive practices. We also simulate real audit questions, enabling our clients to understand their readiness for regulatory audits better.

Observed challenges based on DORA TPRM project engagements

Recently, we’ve collaborated with multiple financial clients on DORA TPRM projects and noticed a couple of recurring challenges:

  • Use of several methods for scoring suppliers and communicating related cyber risks: One score comes from suppliers’ due diligence on their cybersecurity postures, while another is generated by a purchased tool that doesn’t align with the company’s risk levels. Limited resources and fears of reporting shortages to management have led clients to conduct fragmented and unsystematic assessments of their ICT third-party providers, evaluating only a few in detail each time.
  • Inconsistent audit rights and cybersecurity standards: Another issue was that most contracts either prohibited audits of ICT vendors’ cyber resilience or lacked clear provisions for them. This underscored inconsistencies in minimum cybersecurity requirements and often left procurement departments without clear criteria for categorising vendors based on their cybersecurity postures, impacting vendor scoring.

Summary of proposed recommendations and solutions

  1. Alignment of the ICT Risk Management Framework with ICT third-party risk management

We recommend aligning the framework with organisational objectives and risk-acceptance levels and ensuring consistent risk communications. Standardising supply-chain terminology as per ISO/IEC 27036-1 and ISO 22300 is essential to avoid misinterpretations by auditors. Also important is aligning the ICT third-party outsourcing security policy with risk communications and related policies.

  1. Seamless evidence collection and review process as a key compliance success factor

We observed challenges in assigning responsibility for evidence collection to ensure compliance. We stress the need for a clear process to gather and store evidence—including security configurations, service level agreements (SLAs) and contracts—to support incident analyses and demonstrate due care, safeguarding the institution from negligence claims.

  1. Reviewing BIA (business impact analysis) to indicate critical functions by DORA’s definitions

We recommend reviewing the BIA to clearly identify functions deemed critical under DORA. Since DORA’s definition of critical functions stems from another regulation [Article 2(1), point (35), of Directive 2014/59/EU]16, it is crucial to map the institution’s key processes and services to those listed in the existing BIA documentation. The review should also highlight essential resources, including indispensable ICT suppliers supporting these functions.

We advise reviewing recovery time objectives (RTOs), recovery point objectives (RPOs) and other relevant business-continuity management (BCM) and disaster recovery (DR) parameters. Contracts should clarify services, SLAs, responsibilities (via RASCI [Responsible, Accountable, Supportive, Consulted and Informed]—the responsibility assignment matrix) and consequences for non-compliance. It’s crucial to align service-unavailability definitions with these metrics, ensuring downtimes translate accurately to service-unavailability percentages during a disaster.

We noticed that because of the heavy compliance requirements, some ICT TPPs supporting non-critical functions started to wonder if those functions were, in fact, critical, as the compliance demands made them seem overly important.

  1. Contracts information register’s data quality and up-to-date information management

Leveraging our expertise and partner ecosystem, we help clients align their ICT vendor contracts with DORA’s information requirements and related RTS and ITS guidelines. These include the final report on draft RTS on ICT Risk Management Framework and on simplified ICT Risk Management Framework17(Pillar 1: ICT RMF), the final report on draft RTS on ICT services supporting critical or important functions18 (Pillar 4: JC 2023 84) and the final report on draft ITS on Register of Information for ICT third-party contractual registers19 (JC 2023 85). We also consider the consultation paper on subcontracting ICT services20 (JC 2023 67).

We’ve also integrated the ESAs’ 2024 DORA “dry run exercise” deliverables for clients, focusing on reporting contractual arrangements with ICT third-party providers, and explored limited artificial intelligence (AI) tools for managing corporate registers.

It’s noteworthy that most entities lack a unified contract management system (CMS), leading to missing or outdated contracts. While contracts may be accessible online, complete versions are often unavailable due to post-signing changes, resulting in unclear or missing essential information.

  1. Contract remediation or renegotiation (to ensure compliance and address ICT-concentration risks)

We recommend specific updates to the supplier-management procedure to address missing elements, such as including the right to audit instead of just requesting evidence of the cybersecurity posture. We also advise incorporating NIS2 Directive compliance requirements for EU-based ICT providers, as most must report incidents to national authorities and customers, such as financial institutions.

Ensuring third-party vendors meet DORA standards is challenging due to varying maturities, incomplete contractual data and low DORA-compliance awareness among ICT suppliers.

For new procurements, it’s crucial to include all necessary data points in TPP contracts. We help incorporate clear contractual obligations referencing DORA articles and conduct regular training and workshops to educate vendors on DORA standards and expectations.

  1. Regular audits and independent assurance assessments

Regular audits of third-party service providers for operational resilience, including cyber resilience and business continuity, are often too resource-intensive and inconsistent due to suppliers’ inadequate assessments and analyses.

We recommend using industry-recognised supplier assurance frameworksi to verify efforts for each ICT provider, supported by automated cybersecurity-scoring tools aligned with enterprise risk management (ERM) levels. Leveraging independent assurance reports (for example, the American Institute of CPAs’ SOC 1 and SOC 2, the United Kingdom’s Cyber Essentials and NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework [SSDF]21) and cloud-certification schemes can streamline assessments and save time.

Promoting cybersecurity best practices and awareness throughout the ICT service-provider supply chain can balance the need for thorough audits. This approach builds trust by encouraging secure, resilient behaviour and incident notification while maintaining oversight and supervision of cyber postures, reflecting a balanced zero-trust strategy.

  1. Prudent resource allocation

Resource constraints often hinder effective third-party risk management. The Eviden team proposes cost-allocation scenarios based on supplier criticality, comparing expenses for dedicated internal resources against hiring experienced external providers. This guidance was especially beneficial for customers unable to hire internal TPRM experts.

Even with the above recommendations in place, real-life challenges can still derail a DORA TPRM project. For example, an investment fund manager realised mid-project that its budget was insufficient to cover all compliance gaps. In another case, a key decision-maker was replaced, causing months-long delays in compliance and budget planning. To prevent such disruptions, it’s essential to establish safeguards that eliminate single points of human dependency in the workflow.

Eviden has delivered significant value in achieving DORA Pillar 4 compliance. We identify high-priority actions with consideration to organic compliance levels to help clients focus on essential actions and balance compliance costs against potential third-party-risk losses. By establishing a centralised third-party management system—with a comprehensive contract-management database to centralise key clauses—and by automating audit and continuous-monitoring processes, we enhance overall risk visibility and ensure clients achieve and sustain DORA standards. We also drive regular communication and training to foster stronger vendor relationships and promote mutual understanding and compliance.

 

Endnotes

i For supply-chain assurance framework details, please contact the Eviden Team at fsi-coe@eviden.com.

References

1 Eviden: “Conquer DORA compliance: Challenges and strategies for the Digital Operational Resilience Act,” Sławomir Pijanowski, September 3, 2024.

2 European Union (EU): Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011.

3 European Central Bank (ECB): “What is TIBER-EU?“

See also: Tiber.info: Documentation.

4 Bundesbank: “G-7 FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS FOR THREAT-LED PENETRATION TESTING,” October 24, 2018.

5 MITRE ATT&CK: ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise.

6 OWASP: OWASP Web Security Testing Guide.

7 OWASP: OWASP Mobile Application Security.

8 OWASP: “OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide Release,” Sven Schleier, July 29, 2021.

9 TIBER.info: “TIBER-EU can be used to fulfil the DORA TLPT requirements,” Maarten Bras, October 1, 2024.

See also: European Central Bank (ECB): “Adopting TIBER-EU will help fulfil DORA requirements,” September 2024.

10 Ibid.

11 European Union (EU): Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector and amending Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014, (EU) No 909/2014 and (EU) 2016/1011.

12 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA): Final Report on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards to further harmonise ICT risk management tools, methods, processes and policies as mandated under Articles 15 and 16(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, JC 2023 86, January 17, 2024.

13 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA): Final Report on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards to specify the detailed content of the policy in relation to the contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services supporting critical or important functions provided by ICT third-party service providers as mandated by Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, JC 2023 84, January 17, 2024.

14 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA): Final Report on Draft Implementing Technical Standards on the standard templates for the purposes of the register of information in relation to all contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers under Article 28(9) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, JC 2023 85, January 10, 2024.

15 European Banking Authority (EBA): Consultation Paper on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards to specify the elements which a financial entity needs to determine and assess when subcontracting ICT services supporting critical or important functions as mandated by Article 30(5) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, JC 2023 67, November 27, 2023.

16 European Union (EU): Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance. Note: DORA defines “critical functions” as per Article 2(1), point (35) of Directive 2014/59/EU.

17 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA): Final Report on draft RTS on ICT Risk Management Framework and on simplified ICT Risk Management Framework, JC 2023 86.

18 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA): Final Report on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards to specify the detailed content of the policy in relation to the contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services supporting critical or important functions provided by ICT third-party service providers as mandated by Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, JC 2023 84, January 17, 2024.

19 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA): Final Report on Draft Implementing Technical Standards on the standard templates for the purposes of the register of information in relation to all contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers under Article 28(9) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, JC 2023 85, January 10, 2024.

20 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA): Consultation Paper on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards to specify the elements which a financial entity needs to determine and assess when subcontracting ICT services supporting critical or important functions as mandated by Article 30(5) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, JC 2023 67, November 27, 2023.

21 Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC)/NIST: Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF).

 

 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Dr. Sławomir Pijanowski serves as the Global Practice Head for Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) at Eviden’s Global Cybersecurity Consulting, helping clients worldwide navigate complex cyber-resilience and regulatory challenges. With more than 25 years of experience, he specialises in information technology/cybersecurity GRC, business continuity management (BCM), resilience, enterprise risk management (ERM) and regulatory compliance.

Pawan Mishra is the Global Financial Services and Insurance Market Leader at Eviden, and drives the development of Eviden’s value proposition, go-to-market strategy, and marketing for financial services and insurance. He has a strong technical background in IT service delivery and over 10 years of experience crafting technology-driven solutions for the financial industry’s unique challenges and opportunities.

 

 

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