Home FinanceUnited Against the United States?

United Against the United States?

by internationalbanker

By Bala Ramasamy, Associate Dean and Professor of Economics at China Europe International Business School (CEIBS), and Mathew Yeung, Dean of the School of Open Learning and Associate Professor of Marketing at the Lee Shau Kee School of Business and Administration, Hong Kong Metropolitan University

 

 

 

It seems that the only way Mr. Trump knows how to respond to any international issue is to impose tariffs and more tariffs—whether it’s a trade deficit, which is apparently a “major threat to national security”, or drug cartels moving fentanyl across both the northern and southern borders of the United States, or even when former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is “unfairly” treated. More recently, tariffs also entered the plans to bring Russia to the negotiation table vis-à-vis the Russo-Ukrainian War. Is this what drives the Trump team to negotiate unilaterally with individual trading partners? Since the WTO (World Trade Organization) is as good as “dead”, there is no effective supranational body to which countries can complain. Nor is there any enforcement of the rules that have governed international trade over the last two and a half decades.

As a businessman and a real-estate developer, US President Donald Trump is surely familiar with monopolistic powers, and such positions are highly desirable, especially when no one can enforce any form of antitrust regulation. The best way to deal with competitors is to keep them as disunited as possible. It’s no different in international politics, as divide et impera was practiced by the Macedonians and Romans millennia ago. Divide and rule is the way a hegemonic power maintains its position.

Consider Canada, China, the European Union (EU) and Mexico. Together, these four entities account for about 60 percent of total US imports. Nevertheless, Mr. Trump has threatened tariffs of between 30 percent and 55 percent on these countries and regions. One cannot be sure whether these rates will change in the next few weeks, months or years. What should these countries do unilaterally? Should they negotiate or stand their ground? To a large extent, the answer depends on how easily these countries’ exports to the US can be replaced by other countries and/or substituted with domestic sources.

The rearrangement ratio introduced by Olivia White and colleagues at the McKinsey Global Institute is a useful metric defining “how readily a country might shift its imports from one trading partner to others”. A smaller ratio indicates a country’s greater ability to find alternative import sources or rely on domestic production. Take Christmas decorations as an example: The US imports $3 billion from China, while global exports (excluding China’s to the United States) are a mere $600 million. This high rearrangement ratio means US retailers would struggle to replace Chinese suppliers. In fact, there are 175 items for which China is the only source of US imports, including clocks and electric blankets.

We recalculated these ratios for about 5,000 product categories based on the six-digit HS (Harmonized System) classification and averaged them across all products, weighted by the importance of the item in total exports to the US. (We recalculated the rearrangement ratio as follows: US imports of good i from partner country j divided by the total imports of product i by all countries except the US minus US exports of good i. To obtain the ratio across products, we averaged it, weighted by the importance of product i in total imports of the US from country j.) We have presented these ratios for the four entities mentioned above with respect to the importance of the US market to the country or region. We have also included the largest EU country for reference. To create the four quadrants, we used Mexico as the most extreme case.

The positions of the four entities provide an interesting narrative. Canada and Mexico are more alike compared to the EU and China. However, all four entities are in the right-side quadrants. The weakest position to be in is the top-left quadrant, in which exports to the US can be easily replaced, yet the US market makes up a significant proportion of a country’s exports. Luckily, no country in our analysis is in this quadrant.

Mexico and Canada are in fairly good positions to negotiate, as the US needs both countries as much as these North American countries need the US as their largest trading partner. Mexico and Canada can stand their ground because, at some point, President Trump will have to come around and accept the fact that both his neighbors allow the Americans to focus on high-end, high-value-added products. Like China, Mr. Trump’s actions against Mexico are mainly political rhetoric and nothing more. However, relying too much on one market, despite sharing a common border, is never a good strategy. Market diversification is essential for both countries.

For instance, increasing their roles in various trading groups, such as the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) or even seeking membership in the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), would be a step in the right direction, especially for Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. Building stronger trade ties with resource-hungry countries and regions such as China, Japan and the EU would probably have a greater ROI (return on investment) than trying to renegotiate with Trump. The United Kingdom’s playbook post-Brexit is one to copy.

In the lower-left quadrant are the EU and China. For the EU, delaying negotiations with the US seems understandable, although for some members and some industries, the delay could be more costly. The rearrangement ratio is extreme for Germany at only 0.04 (i.e., to the left of the EU in our chart). Other large EU economies are not that different. Standing firm on its principles of “free trade” in the interest of the many rather than giving in for the benefit of the few is necessary for the EU. Trump’s strategy of dealing with defense (NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]) and trade (EU) separately works in favor of the latter. Giving in when it comes to defense spending but staying the course on trade is the right strategy.

China is perhaps in the strongest position to negotiate or even to walk away. The manufacturing ecosystem built over the last 40 years gives China a clear advantage in insisting that the tariff burden is more on the American side, at least in the short to medium term. Finding substitutes for Chinese goods is possible, but it will take time to build manufacturing capacities in other locations, including Vietnam and India. With Chinese companies increasingly expanding their manufacturing facilities abroad, it will become more difficult to strictly identify the country of origin in due course.

What if all four entities were to collude and stand up against Mr. Trump? That would definitely resolve the tariff tantrums, but there is nearly zero political will to do so. As long as the world is disunited, the hegemon rules. However, even the US cannot dismantle the trading system that has been built over the last 70 years during a four-year presidential term. Despite the US inflation rate holding steady in the short term, most analysts predict an uptick in the months to come. When that does happen, and the Federal Reserve (the Fed) raises interest rates to combat it, TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out) will return. What will be left is Tariff in Name Only (TINO), as most goods will be exempted from the blanket tariffs imposed on trading partners. The most logical strategy for Canada, China, the EU and Mexico is to collude and do nothing!

Related Articles